Counter/Consensus: Liberation Day Fallout, Zero Sum U.S.-China Competition, Mexican Pragmatism and Canadian Liberals' Comeback Attempt

1. Liberation Day (Consensus)

Tariffs for one, tariffs for all? The Trump administration’s “Liberation Day” announcements shocked even the most stalwart observers of U.S. tariff policy, flummoxing domestic and overseas policymakers, market makers, and CEOs alike. (Your analysts here at Morning Consult were similarly surprised by the tariffs’ magnitude!).

Mirroring U.S. equity markets in the hours following the announcements, America’s global reputation — measured as global average net favorability among adults in 42 global markets — similarly went into freefall, heading into net negative territory for the first time in years. 

Here and elsewhere, we have documented the impact of the Trump administration’s tariff announcements on global sentiment, suggesting that tariff policy specifically is to blame for at least some of the country’s recent reputational misfortunes. Trends in our data surrounding Liberation Day continue to bear out this assessment.

But while the Trump administration’s 90-day pause on the implementation of so-called “reciprocal tariffs” — which threatened to saddle imports from a large swath of America’s trading partners with historically unprecedented duties — has helped to sustain an equity market rebound, it has proven more Band-Aid than panacea for the country’s global reputation. Per our data, the 90-day pause appears to have stemmed the bleeding — America’s reputation has stabilized since the April 9 pause was announced — but a rebound into positive territory does not appear imminent.

To date, much of our research surrounding the tariffs — most recently updated for a  webinar we hosted last week — has focused on the resulting fallout for U.S. brands doing business overseas arising from country-of-origin effects. For the moment, the recent stabilization of global sentiment toward the United States will afford U.S. corporates more time to get their houses in order when it comes to pricing, messaging, and supply chain strategies, should the reciprocal tariffs ultimately go into effect, and companies would be wise to take advantage of the 90-day reprieve to do so. For the hardest-hit U.S. companies to date — assessed by the decline in net purchasing consideration of U.S. brands we track in tariffed markets via Morning Consult Intelligence — the impact has been severe, with some seeing declines upwards of 20 points from January through March, 2025. With America’s reputation now flatlined in negative territory and a far larger swath of global markets potentially subject to tariffs in the coming days, we expect a wide range of companies will face similar risks for the foreseeable future.

2. U.S.-China Competition (Consensus)

Make China great again. The Trump administration has asserted that tariff-induced pain facing U.S. consumers will ultimately translate into gains for American labor as the U.S. siphons manufacturing jobs back from China and elsewhere, helping to “make America great again.” But as far America’s global standing is concerned, the only country being made great again is China: Per our daily data tracking views of both countries in 41 other markets, global average net favorability of China has now eclipsed that of the United States (see our data from 2024 onwards in the chart below).

Beijing’s newfound fortunes are not entirely of its own making. Global sentiment toward China has been improving slowly but surely from 2024 onwards, marked by a gradual upswing in net favorability. But to a large degree, its leg up over the United States — which began in early March — is attributable to America’s plummeting reputation throughout 2025, which has seen global views of the United States fall far faster than views of China have risen. Most recently, additional reputational damage done by the Trump administration’s “Liberation Day” tariff announcements appears to have sealed the deal.

While the U.S. administration has suggested it plans to use tariff negotiations with its. trading partners to isolate Beijing economically, the effect on U.S. soft power is meanwhile pointing clearly in the opposite direction, turning global public sentiment to China’s advantage. This becomes particularly clear when we examine country-specific changes in net favorability toward the United States and China from Jan. 1, 2025 — just before President Trump’s return to office — to April 15, 2025, shortly after this month’s Liberation Day announcements. 

The large majority of countries simultaneously exhibit worsening views of the United States and improving views of China over this time period. A simple linear model fit to our data lends some additional weight to this interpretation. While the trend (blue line in chart above) is partly driven by Russia — the only country where views of the United States have improved among the general population during this time period — it also holds when Russia is removed from the analysis (yellow line in chart).

If there’s a silver lining for the Trump administration, it’s that public views of China have generally not improved by as much as views of the United States have fallen, suggesting there’s not a one-to-one relationship between them and that other factors are at play. While the United States has seen its overseas reputation decline by well over 25 points in a number of markets, China has not seen a single country’s views shift by that amount. There’s also a small number of major U.S. military partners — France and Japan — where public views of China have worsened slightly, bucking the global trend.

But for policymakers and strategists in Washington thinking through America’s positioning in today’s rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape, these dynamics are more cause for alarm than not. They are also likely to pose problems for U.S. multinationals: As our earlier research has shown, public favorability toward the United States and China in some markets tends to be positively correlated with views on trade and investment flows involving each country’s multinationals, potentially offering advantages to Chinese competitors in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere (as our country affinity research on U.S. brands operating in a wider range of markets has shown). U.S. companies monitoring these dynamics should plan for the worst and hope for the best.

3. Mexico (Counter)

Tariffs? No güey. A large majority of Mexican consumers (77%) have recently seen, read, or heard something about U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats (now partially come to pass) to impose tariffs on goods from Mexico, and they say these threats primarily make them feel angry (54%) and patriotic (38%). We have seen how upset and patriotic consumers — most recently in the case of Canada — can channel their desire for retaliation towards U.S. brands into boycotts. This effect has appeared most strongly in categories with broad consumer bases like quick service restaurants and food & beverage, but other industries like entertainment and travel may also be impacted. Mexico differs in some important ways from Canada, and we expect boycotts south of the border to be shorter in duration and have a more limited impact on U.S. brands. 

When President Trump reiterated his intention to hit Mexico with 25% tariffs after his inauguration, Mexicans’ views of the United States dropped precipitously. Despite their anger, Mexicans’ views did not drop as much as Canadians’ did in response to similar tariff threats, and they almost immediately began to creep back up once reaching their nadir. 

Still, some Mexicans say they are taking action. A third of Mexican consumers say they have stopped buying at least some products made in the United States, and a similar share say they are avoiding goods sold by U.S. companies. Just over 1 in 4 consumers say they are similarly avoiding services from U.S. companies. An additional one-third of Mexicans are considering each of these measures, but haven’t yet taken action. See the full analysis for more on declines in purchase consideration among U.S. brands. 

At the same time, Mexicans are ready to play ball. They are supportive of President Sheinbaum, who enjoys a strong electoral mandate, and of enhancing border security and cooperating more with the United States to combat the flow of fentanyl if Washington imposes additional tariffs, measures which would arguably benefit populations on both sides of the Rio Grande. 

Overall, our assessment is that Mexican boycotts will be less long-lived and impactful than Canadian boycotts for a couple of reasons. 

Mexicans are less affluent than Canadians, so withholding their purchasing will be less impactful on the revenues of boycotted brands unless Mexico is a particularly important market for a given company. As noted above, even while supporting retaliation, Mexicans are strongly in favor of their elected officials making concessions and cooperating more on drug trafficking and migration in light of the tariffs. Mexican president Sheinbaum is near the beginning of her single six-year term and enjoys a strong mandate. She has considerably more political room to maneuver. 

And while Mexicans are angry at the ramped-up tariff rhetoric, they are probably used to having a more tense political relationship with the United States — and certainly with the first Trump administration — characterized by stereotyping related to migration and illegal drugs. Mexican consumers who are inclined to do so are likely to have already reconsidered their consumption patterns in light of their political relationship with the United States, making the current shock less impactful.

4. Canada (Consensus)

Canuck comeback. Canada’s Liberals under Mark Carney are staging a major resurgence after being all but written off as serious contenders in the upcoming April 23 elections. Carney has two men to thank for being within striking distance of a return to the premiership: Justin Trudeau and Donald J. Trump. 

First, Trudeau’s choice to step down, which he announced in January, was an immediate shot in the arm for his own approval rating, though not for the fortunes of the party itself.

Trudeau’s departure laid the groundwork for the Liberals’ meteoric comeback. But Mark Carney and the Liberals’ real hero here is U.S. President Trump, who has repeatedly called for Canada to become the 51st state, imposed tariffs on non-USMCA compliant goods as well as lumber, auto parts and finished automobiles, and steel and aluminum. To put it mildly, this made Canadians angry.

Carney has made hay, positioning himself as someone willing to stand up to the U.S. President. Carney has openly criticized Trump's imposition of 25% tariffs on Canadian goods, labeling them as "unjustified" and detrimental, and his government has implemented (and later made exceptions to) retaliatory tariffs. Beyond trade disputes, Carney has forcefully rebuffed Trump's suggestions of annexing Canada as the 51st U.S. state, colorfully using hockey metaphors to galvanize Canadian voters. His opponent, Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre, had positioned himself as a kind of Canadian Trump, a persona no longer resonating as strongly with Canadian voters. More Canadians had been saying they identified with the Conservative Party for months, but in early March the Liberals surged ahead. They seemed to pick up support from both those who identified as Conservative and from Canadians who previously said no party represented their views.

Carney is now one of the more popular world leaders in our Global Leader Approval Tracker, polling better among Canadians than Trump does among U.S. adults. Canada’s April 23rd election is still a close race, with several crucial days left. But even the fact that the race is close is itself evidence of a historic comeback for Canada’s Liberals. 

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