Morning Consult Counter/Consensus: Global Political Risk Briefing, July 25, 2024

1.  U.S. Reputation (Consensus)

Reputation Era. Europeans’ views of America have worsened amid President Biden’s recent election stumbles, continuing a nearly secular decline in net favorability toward the United States that has lasted for over a year. The trend affirms the prevailing media narrative that former president Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House — which has recently appeared more certain, at least prior to this past weekend’s developments — risks souring trans-Atlantic diplomatic relations while also damaging American soft power in Europe.

Our data on European views comes from our newly launched Global U.S. Reputation Tracker, which monitors views of America in 42 overseas markets, and is current through July 15, just prior to Vice President Kamala Harris’ likely ascendancy to the top of the Democratic ticket. 

Given the timing of the latter, we advise monitoring the data for a potential rebound in European sentiment once the month is closed out. Should one materialize, it suggests a Harris presidency would place relations with Europe on firmer footing, assuming the matchup with Trump plays out in the Democrats’ favor. Both are big “ifs” (the latter per our tracking of the U.S. presidential race from earlier this week).

In parallel, our data shows signs of a tentative rebound in views of America in MENA that has coincided with a less-than-full-throated U.S. endorsement of Israel’s conduct in the ongoing conflict with Hamas over the past several weeks, and a marked uptick in Americans’ support for a cease-fire, with majorities of both Democrats and Republicans in favor.

We caution that Bibi’s address to Washington lawmakers this week will likely rankle publics across the Middle East, in turn undoing the early July bump, and we advise entities with business and diplomatic interests in the region to proceed cautiously until clearer signs of a sustained trend materialize.

2. India (Consensus)

Coalition Dharma. India’s BJP party and PM Narendra Modi emerged from the 2024 general elections significantly weakened. The BJP massively underperformed expectations, with its NDA coalition winning 292 seats after targeting 400. 

Job approval for Modi declined throughout the long electoral process (yellow box in figure), as did Indian adults’ assessments of whether their country was headed in the right direction or had gotten off on the wrong track. Notably, Modi barely got a post-election bump despite technically winning, entering his third term in office without the benefit of a honeymoon period and with an electorate more dissatisfied than at any time since mid-2022.

Additionally, for the first time in 10 years, India’s ruling party has a formal opposition. “Leader of the opposition” in India is a formal role, and requires that the party in question gains at least 10% of legislative seats. The Indian National Congress party (INC) and its leader, Rahul Gandhi, crossed that threshold for the first time during Modi’s tenure, and the share of adults who say their views align most closely with the INC (among the internet-using population we survey daily) increased by close to 10 points during the election period at the expense of the BJP.

This is a new era for Modi. With a more unified opposition, and one with an official role in parliament, he will have to hear criticisms in a more continuous and direct way than during his previous two terms as PM. One criticism that he will not have to hear as much after voters dealt him such a blow is that India is no longer a robust democracy. How’s that for a silver lining?

3. Thailand (Consensus)

Serenity not now. “No rest for the weary” was likely not incumbent PM Srettha Thavisin’s desired outcome following Thailand’s Senate elections on June 26, but it’s the message our data is sending. Since the elections, the share of Thai adults who “strongly disapprove” of Srettha has rebounded dramatically, and appears pinned near the higher end of its range over his time in office. Particularly damaging for Srettha, the increase in disapproval has largely come from the share of adults who formerly indicated they “strongly approved” of him, suggesting discontent among his erstwhile most enthusiastic supporters.

The trend tracks with the election outcomes, which saw Srettha’s Pheu Thai party underperform conservative elements. In the coming weeks, Srettha will be further pressured by a Constitutional Court case that could see the Move Forward party dissolved (a decision is slated for Aug. 7) and a separate case that could see him ousted from office (a decision is slated for Aug. 14).

Ahead of the first court ruling, we note that protests ensued when Move Forward’s predecessor, Future Forward, was dissolved in 2020. We expect a similar outcome in the months ahead, should the current incarnation of the party again be dissolved. Srettha’s ouster, should it materialize, could perhaps play a mitigating role. 

Net views of Thailand’s trajectory have meanwhile tipped into negative territory for the first time in a year following a recent uptick in the share of adults who say the country is on the wrong track. The Senate elections were not necessarily the sole driver — negative sentiment has been trending upward since early June — but they are likely a contributing factor. 

The trend also suggests that Srettha’s near-simultaneous and long-sought rollout of the digital wallet scheme — approved in April and scheduled to begin in August — will be insufficient to tip things in his favor. Handouts may fatten the wallet, but all signs suggest they won’t make the heart grow fonder as far as views of Srettha’s are concerned.

4. Indonesia (Counter)

Quiet on the Eastern front. Indonesia recently announced a slew of tariffs targeting Chinese imports potentially reaching 200% (yes, you read that right). In the United States and Europe, recent bouts of tariff imposition targeting China — which have increasingly been tied to national security concerns — have coincided with net negative and periodically worsening views of China. Not so for Indonesia: Net favorability toward China among Indonesian adults has been trending gradually upwards since late 2021 when we first began tracking it, and has remained elevated following the tariff announcement. 

As Indonesia-watchers at the Australian Institute for International Affairs and The Diplomat have noted, the rationale for the tariffs was more economic than geopolitical, and “the issue has not been securitized in Indonesia to the extent that it has in the United States and other parts of the democratic West” (quote from the latter).

For those who might be inclined to view Indonesia’s latest tariff maneuvers as a tipping of the geopolitical needle in favor of the West at China’s expense, our data sounds a clear cautionary note that the two are not clearly related at present.

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