Counter/Consensus: Reactions to Trump, Tariffs, U.K. PM Starmer, and Pakistani Political Risk

1. U.S. reputation (Consensus)

How low can you go? We previously noted that our data from many NATO countries suggested Europeans were following the U.S. elections with a great deal of trepidation. In the days since President Trump’s decisive electoral victory, their views of the United States — measured by net favorability toward America — have begun to dip.

The two questions this poses are first, how low could views go and second, how is it likely to matter? 

On the first point, if we consider favorability toward the United States among treaty allies at the tail end of the previous Trump administration, they were over 30 points lower than they are now, showing that mechanically there is ample room for views among America’s global partners to sour. As far as timing is concerned, we saw sentiment respond immediately to Biden’s election in November 2020, but the full effect was seen only after his inauguration. In that case, the rebound in America’s reputation was temporarily arrested by negative views of the events of Jan. 6.

We expect to see views continue to sink in the coming days as our data fully incorporates what appears to be a generally negative take on the 2024 election outcome among populations in allied countries. But we also expect the main impact of President Trump’s return to office on the country’s reputation to be based on what he says and does once in office. 

Which brings us to the second question. How much do allies’ views actually matter? Public opinion can matter in a number of ways. For industries which rely directly on foreigners having positive views of the United States, like tourism and higher education, public opinion can matter a great deal. It can also matter for U.S. companies serving consumers in other markets, as our country affinity work has shown. 

For U.S. foreign policy, it matters less directly, but it can still have an effect. No allied country’s leadership can afford not to work with the United States, and thus with its elected representatives. But Joseph Nye has pointed out that cooperation is a matter of degree, rather than binary. Public opinion can influence the degree to which countries contribute to collective defense, vote with the United States in the United Nations, and support U.S. security arrangements. Officials in the first Trump administration were fond of saying “America first does not mean America alone.” If the incoming administration can learn to speak softly as well as carry a big stick, this could be entirely true. 

2. United Kingdom (Counter)

Starmer vs. the lettuce. While we agree that incumbent Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s honeymoon is largely over, as we noted in our political risk rating downgrade for the United Kingdom this month, we disagree with narratives labeling his brief tenure as the worst start in living memory. That dubious honor goes to Liz Truss. 

To be sure, Truss did not have the advantage of riding into office on the back of a decisive electoral victory (low turnout notwithstanding). But she did get a small favorability boost as she took office, which rapidly dipped into the lowest approval rating of a U.K. chief executive since we began tracking views of them in 2018, with net approval of Truss reaching -55 at its lowest monthly reading. With 130 days at #10 Downing under his belt, Starmer has also far outlived the length of Truss’ tenure — she left office after merely 44 days.

Obviously, beating Truss’ record was nothing to aspire to. Starmer’s initial months as PM have been marred by scandals over gifts, tensions between senior staff, and anti-immigrant riots. The government’s move to cut fuel subsidies to millions of pensioners was also deeply unpopular, as was the budget released in October which roiled bond markets, somewhat reminiscent of Liz Truss’ mini budget and her brief tenure at 10 Downing Street. And we see room for approval of Starmer to fall even further in the coming weeks and months. (See our latest MACRO Political Briefing for the details, where we have assigned the United Kingdom a negative outlook with medium confidence for the coming six months.) 

Even if Starmer manages to avoid further gaffes, nothing on the horizon appears favorable for overall U.K. political sentiment in the near term. Lower growth projections necessitate a more modest budget with tax increases or spending cuts. Migration will continue to be a political bugbear, particularly asylum seekers’ crossing the English channel via small boats, which hasn’t slowed. And declining satisfaction with public services as characterized by reporting on the sorry state of the National Health Service will require years of reform and unpopular changes. 

3. Pakistan (Counter)

Down but not out. This month our political risk rating for Pakistan saw the country receive an upgrade, reflecting a slightly better risk profile in October relative to September. (For readers who are new to our risk ratings, they’re constructed as the intra-month average of net leader approval — in this case, of incumbent Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif — and the net share of Pakistani adults who say their country is moving in the right direction).

On the one hand, we caution against making too much of the country’s improved risk profile: Pakistan’s risk rating has vacillated in a relatively narrow band from late 2023 onwards, and it remains well below the ratings seen during former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s tenure.

On the other hand, we think the country’s sideways trending rating is noteworthy for what it implies about public support for Sharif’s government: namely, a counter-consensus narrative that despite an onslaught of controversial political maneuvers targeting Khan’s PTI party and hardship linked to ongoing IMF-related austerity measures, public buy-in for the incumbent government has not clearly declined.

In our view, improving public perceptions of the country’s economic situation appear to be keeping a lid on political risks emanating from the PTI’s ongoing discontentment with Sharif, and are at least partly to thank for the country’s improved rating. From mid-August onwards, the net share of Pakistani adults holding positive views of the country’s economy, though still in sharply negative territory, increased by roughly 10 points (assessed on a 30-day rolling basis), with a contemporaneous increase of roughly 15 points among PML-N supporters (Sharif’s party), and a smaller but still noteworthy 6-point increase among PTI supporters, who are aligned with Khan. In a similar vein, Morning Consult’s Pakistan Index of Consumer Sentiment also increased on net from September through October. On both fronts, an outsized improvement in the inflation rate from August-October is the most likely driver. 

Where do things go from here? To be sure, Pakistan’s economy remains an IMF-supported house of cards and subsequent loan disbursements will entail extensive policy rationalization that is likely to irk the public. Our data also only incorporates sentiment among online Pakistanis, so it may discount the views of poorer segments of the population that might be more disgruntled. And Khan’s “final call” for protests in Islamabad on Nov. 24 will turn up the political heat even further. But barring more extreme developments — such as Khan passing away from prison-related mistreatment — Sharif appears to have contained the near-term risk of public fallout better than recent media coverage has implied.

4. U.S. Foreign Policy (Consensus)

Tariff Man cometh. Fans of president-elect Trump’s first term urge observers to take his rhetoric seriously but not literally. In the case of tariffs, Trump leaned in on the campaign trail, promising 20% blanket tariffs on all imported goods and as much as 60% tariffs on goods from China. This leaves concerned global producers with a big question mark over how large tariffs might be, where they will be applied, and when they could be levied. 

The narrative was certainly popular during the campaign, yet U.S. voters and Republicans in particular don’t view tariffs as an immediate priority for the new administration. Only 1 in 3 Republican voters says imposing tariffs should be a top priority, compared to large majorities prioritizing immigration issues such as stemming the flow of illegal migrants, deporting those already in the United States and reforming immigration policy.  

That said, Trump has already linked tariffs and immigration, threatening to slap 25% tariffs on Mexico if Sheinbaum’s government fails to help stem the flow of illegal migrants. Given the salience of immigration issues for Republican voters, this is a likely first case where the administration could reach for its favored foreign policy tool. 

Even if the exact tariff rates that will be applied are an open question, more tariffs are coming, but CEOs say they’re ready. Their plans mostly seem to include passing the cost along to customers or shifting production away from China (but not necessarily to the United States), in addition to stockpiling inventory over the near-term. Looking back to the first Trump administration for clues, we can comfortably say that tariffs will be used to provide the administration with leverage to seek concessions from international partners, whether allies, adversaries, or something in between — regardless of when they are ultimately implemented. 

Like our data?

Data is a dish best served cold (and ideally via API). That’s why we don’t do hot takes. Please contact us with inquiries regarding Morning Consult’s Political Intelligence data and companion syndicated products, including Morning Consult Pro, the home for our global and U.S. political analysis.